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Abstract
We examine two departures of individual perceptions of randomness from probability theory: the hot hand and the
gambler’s fallacy, and their respective opposites. This paper’s first contribution is to use data from the field (individuals
playing roulette in a casino) to demonstrate the existence and impact of these biases that have been previously docu-
mented in the lab. Decisions in the field are consistent with biased beliefs, although we observe significant individual
heterogeneity in the population. A second contribution is to separately identify these biases within a given individual,
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hot hand and gambler’s fallacy biases, suggesting a common (root) cause of the two related errors. We speculate as to
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1 Introduction
Almost every decision we make involves uncertainty in
some way. Yet research on decision making under un-
certainty demonstrates that our judgments are often not
consistent with probability theory. Intuitive ideas of ran-
domness depart systematically from the laws of chance.
This research suggests that we have developed a number
of judgment heuristics for analyzing complex, real-world
events. Although many decisions based on these heuris-
tics are consistent with probability theory, there are also
situations where heuristics lead to statistical illusions and
suboptimal actions.
This paper investigates the existence and impact of two
of these statistical illusions; the gambler’s fallacy and
the hot hand. Both of these illusions characterize in-
dividuals’ perceptions of non-autocorrelated random se-
quences. Thus both involve perceptions of sequences of
events rather than one-time events.
The gambler’s fallacy is a belief in negative autocor-
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relation of a non-autocorrelated random sequence of out-
comes like coin flips. For example, imagine Jim repeat-
edly flipping a (fair) coin and guessing the outcome be-
fore it lands. If he believes in the gambler’s fallacy, then
after observing three heads in a row, his subjective prob-
ability of seeing another head is less than 50%. Thus he
believes a tail is “due,” and is more likely to appear on
the next flip than a head.
In contrast, the hot hand is a belief in positive auto-
correlation of a non-autocorrelated random sequence of
outcomes like winning or losing. For example, imagine
Rachel repeatedly flipping a (fair) coin and guessing the
outcome before it lands. If she believes in the hot hand,
then after observing three correct guesses in a row her
subjective probability of guessing correctly on the next
flip is higher than 50%. Thus she believes that she is
“hot” and more likely than chance to guess correctly.
Notice that these two biases are not simply opposites.
The gambler’s fallacy describes beliefs about outcomes
of the random process (e.g., heads or tails), while the hot
hand describes beliefs of outcomes of the individual (like
wins and losses). In the gambler’s fallacy, the coin is due;
in the hot hand the person is hot. For purposes of our
study, we will identify four possible biases that individu-
als could exhibit. The gambler’s fallacy and its opposite,
the hot outcome, are beliefs about the coin’s outcomes
involving negative versus positive autocorrelation of ran-
dom outcomes. The hot hand and its opposite, the stock
of luck, are beliefs about the individual’s success involv-
ing positive versus negative autocorrelation of winning or
losing.
1
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Thus someone can believe both in the gambler’s fallacy
(that after three coin flips of heads tails is due) and the
hot hand (that after three wins they will be more likely to
correctly guess the next outcome of the coin toss). These
biases are believed to stem from the same source, the rep-
resentativeness heuristic, as discussed below (Gilovich,
Vallone and Tversky 1985).
In this paper we use empirical data from gamblers in
casinos to examine the existence, prevalence and correla-
tion between gambler’s fallacy and hot hand beliefs. A
companion paper, Croson and Sundali (2005) uses the
same data to examine the aggregate (market) impact of
these biases. In contrast, here we will identify the biases
at the individual level, and examine the within-participant
correlation between the two.
Empirical data, while difficult to obtain and to code,
can provide an important complement and robustness
check on other methods in investigating biases. Partici-
pants in the casinos are making real decisions with their
own money on the line. Further, the participants repre-
sent a more motivated sample than typical students at a
university; gamblers have a very real incentive to learn
the game they are playing and to make decisions in ac-
cordance with their beliefs.
The use of casino data does, however, involve some
limitations. In particular, we were prevented from di-
rectly contacting the gamblers in the study, thus we can-
not ask particular individuals why they bet how they did
or about their beliefs at the time of placing the bet. Also,
the gambling population, while motivated, is a selected
subsample of the population at large. Thus we will have
to be cautious in our claims of external validity from this
study. Nonetheless, we believe that the demonstration of
these biases in the field at the level of the individual is an
important contribution in and of itself. We are also one
of the very few papers to identify multiple biases within
an individual and to characterize the correlation between
them.
1.1 Definitions and previous research
1.1.1 Gambler’s fallacy
The gambler’s fallacy is defined as an (incorrect) belief in
negative autocorrelation of a non-autocorrelated random
sequence.1 For example, individuals who believe in the
gambler’s fallacy believe that after three red numbers ap-
pearing on the roulette wheel, a black number is “due,”
that is, is more likely to appear than a red number.
Gambler’s fallacy-type beliefs were first observed in
the laboratory (under controlled conditions) in the litera-
1Or, more generally, a belief in a more negative autocorrelation than
is present. Thus when an individual overestimates the amount of nega-
tive autocorrelation in any sequence, we could say they were exhibiting
gambler’s fallacy beliefs as well.
ture on probability matching. In these experiments sub-
jects were asked to guess which of two colored lights
would next illuminate. After seeing a string of one out-
come, subjects were significantly more likely to guess
the other, an effect referred to in that literature as neg-
ative recency (see Estes, 1964, and Lee, 1971, for re-
views). Ayton and Fischer (2004) also demonstrate the
existence of gambler’s fallacy beliefs in the lab when sub-
jects choose which of two colors will appear next on a
simulated roulette wheel. Gal and Baron (1996) show
that gambler’s fallacy behavior is not simply caused by
boredom; participants in their experiments were asked
how they would best maximize their earnings, and they
responded with gambler’s fallacy type logic.
The gambler’s fallacy is thought to be caused by
the representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman
1971, Kahneman and Tversky 1972). Here, chance is per-
ceived as “a self-correcting process in which a deviation
in one direction induces a deviation in the opposite direc-
tion to restore the equilibrium” (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974, p. 1125). Thus after a sequence of three red num-
bers appearing on the roulette wheel, black is more likely
to occur than red because a sequence red-red-red-black is
more representative of the underlying distribution than a
sequence red-red-red-red. We test for the gambler’s fal-
lacy in our data by looking at the impact of previous out-
comes on current bets at roulette. People who believe
in the gambler’s fallacy should be less likely to bet on a
number that has previously appeared.
For purposes of this analysis, we will examine two sep-
arate definitions of hotness, hot outcome and hot hand.
Hot outcome will simply be the opposite of the gambler’s
fallacy, that is, an (incorrect) belief in positive autocor-
relation of a non-autocorrelated random sequence.2 For
example, individuals who believe in hot outcome believe
that after three red numbers appearing on the roulette
wheel, another red number is more likely to appear than
a black number because red numbers are hot. Notice that
here the outcomes are hot (e.g., red numbers), rather than
individuals, as in the hot hand, below.
In the lab, the literature on probability matching also
provides evidence favoring hot outcome beliefs. Ed-
wards (1961), Lindman and Edwards (1961) and Feld-
man (1959) all found positive recency effects in proba-
bility matching tasks. In particularly long sequences of
the probability matching game, participants were signifi-
cantly more likely to guess the same outcome as had been
observed previously.3
2Or, more generally, a belief in a more positive autocorrelation than
is present. Thus when an individual overestimates the amount of posi-
tive autocorrelation in any sequence, we could say they were exhibiting
hot outcome beliefs as well.
3The hot outcome bias is related but not identical to the construct
referred to by Keren and Lewis (1994) as the gambler’s fallacy type II.
They present results of a questionnaire study in the lab demonstrating
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We will test for hot outcome beliefs in our data by
looking at the impact of previous outcomes on current
bets at roulette. If gamblers believe in hot outcomes, they
should be more likely to bet on an outcome that has pre-
viously been observed. Thus a positive relationship be-
tween previously-observed outcomes and current bets is
indicative of a belief in hot outcomes.4
1.1.2 Hot hand
Hot hand is different from hot outcome. Rather than be-
lieving that a particular outcome is hot, individuals who
believe in the hot hand believe that a particular person is
hot. For example, if an individual has won in the past,
whatever numbers they choose to bet on are likely to win
in the future, not just the numbers they’ve won with pre-
viously.
Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky (1985) demonstrated
that individuals believe in the hot hand in basketball
shooting, and that these beliefs are not correct (i.e., bas-
ketball shooters’ probability of success is indeed serially
uncorrelated). Other evidence from the lab shows that
subjects in a simulated blackjack game bet more after a
series of wins than they do after a series of losses, both
when betting on their own play and on the play of others
(Chau & Phillips, 1995). Further evidence of the hot hand
in a laboratory experiment comes from Ayton and Fis-
cher (2004). Participants exhibit more confident in their
guesses of what color will next appear after a string of
correct guesses than after a string of incorrect guesses.
Explanations for the hot hand are numerous. It is
clearly related to the illusion of control (Langer, 1975),
where individuals believe they can control outcomes that
are, in fact, random. Gilovich et al., (1985) suggest
that the hot hand also arises out of the representativeness
heuristic, just as the gambler’s fallacy. They write
A conception of chance based on representa-
tiveness, therefore, produces two related bi-
ases. First, it induces a belief that the proba-
bility of heads is greater after a long sequence
of tails than after a long sequence of heads
that individuals underestimate the number of observations necessary to
detect biased roulette wheels. Thus after seeing even a small streak of
red numbers, gamblers might believe the wheel is biased and expect
more red numbers. The number of spins participants believe they need
to observe to detect a biased wheel, while significantly smaller than the
true number of spins necessary, as derived in Ethier (1982), is signifi-
cantly larger than the number of spins any individual in our data set will
observe.
4One can construct other explanations for the behavior we here at-
tribute to the hot outcome. For example, perhaps numbers that have
recently hit on the roulette wheel are more available to the gambler
than other numbers. This availability may cause the gambler to bet on
numbers that have recently hit. Unfortunately in our empirical data we
will not be able to distinguish between these alternative causes of this
behavior, although previous lab research can and has done so.
— this is the notorious gambler’s fallacy (see,
e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). Second,
it leads people to reject the randomness of se-
quences that contain the expected number of
runs because even the occurrence of, say, four
heads in a row — which is quite likely in a se-
quence of 20 tosses — makes the sequence ap-
pear nonrepresentative. (p. 296).
This second explanation is supported by data in which
participants are asked to generate strings of random num-
bers. The strings generated produced significantly fewer
runs of the same outcome than a truly random sequence
would (see Wagenaar 1972 for a review, for an exception
see Rapoport & Budesceu 1992).
We will test for hot hand beliefs in our data by looking
at how betting behavior changes in response to wins and
losses. In particular, hot hand beliefs predict that after
winning, individuals will increase the number of bets they
place and after losing, decrease them.
Just as the gambler’s fallacy and the hot outcome are
opposing biases, the hot hand has an opposing bias, re-
ferred to here as “stock of luck” beliefs. Individuals be-
lieve they have a stock or fixed amount of luck and, once
it’s spent, their probability of winning decreases. Thus
after a string of wins, individuals are less likely to win
(rather than more likely as predicted by the hot hand) be-
cause they have exhausted their stock of luck. The ef-
fect has been demonstrated in the lab by Leopard (1978)
who examines choice behavior in a series of gambles and
demonstrates that subjects take more risk after losing than
after winning, suggesting that their bad luck is about to
change or their good luck about to run out.5
Stock of luck beliefs predict that after winning, indi-
viduals will decrease the number of bets they place and,
after a loss, increase them. Thus a negative relationship
observed between current betting behavior and previous
wins/losses will provide evidence for this bias.
1.2 Individual differences
A large literature identifies individual differences in risk
attitudes (e.g., Weber et al.,1992; Blais & Weber, 2006;
Harris et al., 2006). In addition, previous work has iden-
tified individual heterogeneity in biased beliefs about se-
quences of gambles. Friedland (1988) uses a personality
inventory to categorize individuals into luck-oriented and
5As with the hot outcome above, there are alternative explanations
for these behaviors as well. For example, wealth effects or house money
effects might cause an increase in betting after a win (hot hand) (Thaler
& Johnson 1990). Prospect theory’s assumption of increased risk-
seeking in losses might cause an increase in betting after a loss (stock
of luck). In the lab, these effects can be separated by eliciting beliefs
directly as in Ayton and Fischer (2004). In our empirical data we will
not be able to distinguish between these alternative explanations.
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chance-oriented. In a questionnaire design, he finds gam-
blers’ fallacy behavior in luck-oriented individuals but no
such behavior, and in particular, no dependence of current
bets on past outcomes, in chance-oriented individuals.
In the field, previous work has also found individ-
ual heterogeneity in biased beliefs. Keren and Wage-
naar (1985) examine blackjack play of 47 individuals
who played at least 75 hands and changed their bets over
time. Of these, 25 had relationships between previous
outcomes and bet changes (thus, exhibiting a bias of some
sort). Fourteen of them increased their bets after they won
and decreased them after they lost (consistent with the hot
hand), while 11 decreased their bets after winning and in-
creased them after losing (consistent with stock of luck).
As in these studies, we will use our data to analyze indi-
vidual differences in betting behavior.
Only two previous papers examine field behavior at
roulette. The first is an observational sociological field
study by Oldman (1974) which informally reports both
the gambler’s fallacy and the hot outcome. He writes
that “[t]he bet on a particular spin tends to be placed on
outcomes that are ‘due’ either because they have not oc-
curred for some time or because that is the way ‘things
are running.”’ (p. 418). The second source, Wagenaar
(1988, Ch. 4), discusses data from 29 roulette players in
a casino who stayed between 1 and 18 spins each. Of
the 11 players who varied their bets most, he finds after
a win 39% of bets involve increased risk (hot hand) and
61% involve decreased risk (stock of luck). After a loss,
43% of bets involve decreased risk (hot hand) and 57%
of bets do not (stock of luck). However, Wagenaar does
not present an analysis of how individuals differ on this
dimension.
While previous papers have investigated the gambler’s
fallacy and hot hand biases, our work makes two impor-
tant and original contributions. First, it provides a field
setting in which it is possible to investigate both biases
at once. These biases have been analyzed together only
in the lab (Ayton and Fischer 2004). Second, our empiri-
cal data will allow us to identify individual differences in
these biases. We will be able to examine the correlation
between these biases within the individual.6
1.3 Field data
In this study we use observational data from the field;
individuals betting at roulette in a casino. Roulette is a
useful game for a number of reasons. First, it is serially
uncorrelated, unlike other casino games like blackjack
6Our companion paper, Croson and Sundali (2005) has examined
thee data at the aggregate level. There we provide evidence that the
wheel is unbiased, that gambler’s fallacy behavior is observed in outside
bets after long streaks (5 and 6 observations of the same type), and that,
in aggregate, individuals place more bets after they have won a previous
bet than after they have lost one (or than on their first spin).
or baccarat where cards are dealt without replacement.
Second, each player has his or her own colored chips,
thus tracking an individual’s betting behavior is feasible.
Finally, roulette is an extremely popular and accessible
game which requires relatively little skill to play (unlike
craps, for example, which is perceived as a game for ex-
perts). Thus roulette is likely to suffer from less selection
bias than craps, although we are already selecting partic-
ipants from the casino gambling population, mentioned
above as an unavoidable selection bias.
1.3.1 Roulette
Roulette involves a dealer (sometimes two), a wheel and
a layout. The wheel is divided into 38 even sectors, num-
bered 1-36, plus 0 and 00. Each space is red or black,
with the 0 and 00 colored green. The wheel is arranged
as shown in Figure 1, such that red and black numbers
alternate.
Figure 1: The wheel
Players arrive at the roulette table and offer the dealer
money (either cash or casino chips). In exchange, they
are given special roulette chips for betting at this wheel.
These chips are not valid anywhere else in the casino, and
each player at the table has a unique color of chips. Play-
ers bet by placing chips on a numbered layout, the wheel
is spun and a small white ball rolled around its edge. The
ball lands on a particular number in the wheel, which
is the winning number for that round, and is announced
publicly by the dealer. Next, the dealer clears away all
losing bets, players who had bet on the winning num-
ber (in some configuration) are paid in their own-colored
chips and a new round of betting begins.
Figure 2 shows a typical layout, along with the types
of bets that can be made. Unlike the wheel, the layout is
arranged in numerical order. Players can place their bets
on varying places on the layout. Bets of the type on the
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number 30 are called “straight up” bets. These are bets on
a single number. If the number comes up on the wheel,
this bet would pay the player 36 for 1 (35 to 1). That is,
when 1 chip is bet, the dealer pays the player 35 chips
directly, and the chip that was bet is not removed from
the table. Bets of the type between the 8 and 11, “line
bets” are bets on two numbers. If either of the numbers
comes up, this bet pays the player 18 for 1. Players can
also bet on combinations of 3 numbers (by the 13) which
pay 12 for 1, combinations of 4 numbers (on the corner
of 17-18-20-21) which pay 9 for 1, or combinations of 6
numbers (by the 22-25) which pay 6 for 1. Players can, of
course, bet on “outside” bets like red/black, even/odd and
low/high. These bets will not be included in our analysis,
as they are not bet often enough to allow identification at
the individual level, but are discussed in our companion
paper on aggregate behavior, Croson and Sundali (2005).
Figure 2: The layout
Notice that all these bets have the same expected value,
-5.26% on a double-zero wheel.7 Since the house advan-
tage on (almost) all bets at the wheel is the same, there
is no economic reason to bet one way or another (or for
that matter, at all). In this paper, we will compare ac-
tual betting behavior we observe against a benchmark of
random betting and search for systematic and significant
deviations from that benchmark.
2 Method
The data were gathered from a large casino in Reno,
Nevada, and were also used in Croson and Sundali (2005)
to examine aggregate behavior.8 Casino executives sup-
plied the researchers with security videotapes for 18
hours of play of a single roulette table. The videotapes
consisted of three separate six-hour time blocks over a
7This statement is not strictly true. One bet has a house advantage
of 7.89%. The bet involves placing a chip on the outside corner of the
layout between 0 and 1. The bet wins if 0, 00, 1, 2 or 3 appears, but
pays only 6 for 1 (as though the bet were covering 6 numbers instead
of 5). We observed only 75 instances of this bet being placed (out of
22,527 bets). Only 11 different individuals placed this bet (out of 139
identifiable individuals in our data), and of them, only 6 placed this bet
more than twice.
8At the time of data collection a casino in Washoe County, Nevada,
was classified as “large” by the Nevada Gaming Control Board if total
(yearly) gaming revenues for the property exceeds $36 million.
3-day period in July of 1998.9 The videotapes provided
an overhead view of the roulette area. The camera an-
gle was focused on the roulette layout to allow the coding
of bets placed and to protect player anonymity. Players
were not directly visible, however individual bets could
be tracked by the color of the chips being used. The
videotape was subtitled with a time counter. Note that
while many casinos employ electronic displays showing
previous outcomes of the wheel, this casino had no such
displays at the time the data was collected.
A research assistant was employed to view and record
player bet data from these videotapes. Players were iden-
tified based upon the color of the chips being used to bet,
the player’s location at the table, and any distinct char-
acteristics of the player’s hand or arm such as jewelry,
clothing, tattoos, etc. Players who ran out of chips and
immediately bought more (of the same color) were coded
as the same player. Players who ran out of chips and did
not immediately buy more were coded as having left the
table. When money was again exchanged for chips of that
particular color, we assumed a new player had joined the
table.10
The videotape methodology made it possible to view
all of bets made by each player with a high degree of
accuracy. However, while we could observe if a player
bet on a particular number, given the angle of the cam-
era (from above), we could not observe how many chips
he or she bet on a particular number. Thus we simplified
the data recording to include simply a bet being placed,
without mention of how much the bet was. In order to be
consistent in not recording the amount bet, we coded bets
on multiple numbers (fractional bets like those in Figure
2) the same as we recorded bets on single numbers. For
example, a player could place a single “corner bet” on
17, 18, 20, 21 by placing his chip at the intersection of
these numbers. We recorded this bet as a bet placed on
each of the four numbers. We limit our analysis in this
paper to bets placed in the inside of the roulette layout,
thus we do not count bets placed on black/red, even/odd,
high/low, 1st, 2nd or 3rd 12 or columns in our data; the
interested reader can find analysis of these outside bets in
aggregate in Croson and Sundali (2005). After the assis-
9The three time blocks were from 4:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., 8:00
p.m. to 2:00 a.m., and 10:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. These time blocks were
appropriate since the majority of gaming business is done in the evening
hours.
10This coding has the potential to introduce two possible errors; two
different people could be counted as the same person, or the same per-
son could be counted as two different people. We believe that the first of
these errors is minimized; when chips were depleted and someone im-
mediately purchased more, the coder could recognize from their hand
characteristics if it was the same person. Additionally, this casino has
many roulette tables, it was rare that this table was full or that people
were waiting to buy in immediately after someone had gone bust. The
second error may be somewhat more likely, here we rely on the obser-
vation that if an individual wants to rebuy, (s)he rarely waits to do so.
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tant recorded all of the bets from the 18 hours of video-
tape, one of the principal investigators performed an audit
check to insure accuracy.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive statistics: The wheel and
the bets
Nine hundred and four spins of the roulette wheel were
captured in this data set (approximately 1 spin per
minute). The expected frequency of a single number on a
perfectly fair roulette wheel is 1/38 or 2.6%. In this sam-
ple the most frequent outcome was number 30 at 3.7%,
the least frequent outcome was number 26 at 1.7%. These
data provide no evidence that the wheel is biased.11 Ta-
ble 1 presents the outcomes and the bets placed during
our sample.
If players bet randomly, we would expect them to bet
on each number equally, thus 2.6% of the bets should fall
on each number, independently of the history of numbers
which have appeared. This independence is what we will
test in our analyses.
3.2 Gambler’s fallacy vs. hot outcome
We will use a general linear model to analyze the prob-
ability of a bet being placed on a number that has previ-
ously appeared, versus one which has not. Our dependent
variable, Pit is binary; if a bet was placed on number i on
spin t, we record a success (1). If no bet was so placed,
we record a failure (0). Thus we will try to predict, on the
basis of previous outcomes, whether a player will bet on
a particular number.
Independent variables include an intercept, a measure
of the hotness of a number, a control for the player’s “fa-
vorite” numbers and a control for leaving a bet on the
table. We measure a number’s hotness by calculating a
measure of how often the number i has appeared while
the player was at the table in the spins before spin t. In
particular, Hit is how many times number i has appeared
while the player was at the table before round t minus
the expected frequency of the number i appearing. This
expected frequency is simply (1-(37/38)t-1) where (t-1) is
the number of trials observed by the player so far. This
hotness measure thus calculates the actual frequency of
a number appearing minus the expected frequency. If a
number has appeared more than expected, this hotness
measure is positive, otherwise it is negative.
11 Based on the work of Ethier (1982), Keren and Lewis (1994) report
that the number of observations necessary to detect a favorable number
(bias) is generally quite large. For example, on a wheel with 37 numbers
it would be necessary to view 30,195 spins in order to detect a bias of
1/33 with a 90% level of certainty.
If players bet according to the gambler’s fallacy, the
probability of their betting on a given number should be
negatively related to its hotness measure; numbers which
have come up more frequently while they were at the ta-
ble are less likely to be bet on. In contrast, if players
bet according to the hot outcome, the probability of their
betting on a given number should be positively related to
its hotness measure. Notice that this hotness measure is
calculated separately for each individual in each period,
based on what they have observed up to the point of plac-
ing their bets.
The second independent variable is an attempt to con-
trol for the baseline bets of individuals. Roulette players
often bet the same numbers consistently and repeatedly;
the bets don’t vary with past outcomes. Thus, we need
to control for these bets. Some players get lucky and
hit those numbers (and others don’t), which could cause
the first type of players to look as though they were bet-
ting numbers which had come up before and the second,
those which hadn’t. Instead, we want to look at devia-
tions from betting patterns as numbers come up. Thus
in the model, we include Fit, the percentage of spins on
which the player has bet on number i previously to period
t.
We expect the coefficient on this variable to be sig-
nificant and positive (if players bet on a number previ-
ously, they are more likely to bet on it again). However,
our main reason for including it is to control for under-
lying personal preferences over numbers that might bias
our coefficient of interest, the hotness measure. Thus a
significant coefficient on the hotness measure measures a
deviation from the expected betting pattern of an individ-
ual, given their bets up until now.
The final independent variable, Lit, controls for a be-
havioral anomaly particular to roulette. When a bet wins,
the dealer pays the winnings directly to the player, but
leaves the winning chip on the same spot on the table.
Many players are reluctant to move this winning chip,
claiming it is unlucky. If we were to count that unmoved
chip as a bet, we would bias the results toward hot out-
come, as players are often betting (by default) on num-
bers that have won in the previous round.12 We control
for this behavior by including an independent variable
that equals one if an individual has bet on a number in
the previous round and it has won, and a zero otherwise.
12This behavior is consistent with the status quo bias (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser 1988) or the omission/commission bias (Ritov and Baron
1992, Baron and Ritov 2004), as this chip represents a bet that has been
placed by default. Thus one can interpret a positive significant coeffi-
cient on this variable as evidence for these biases in this dataset. A pos-
itive coefficient on this variable is also consistent with Wagenaar (1988)
who found 70 out of 75 winning bets in his data were not moved. How-
ever, as this is not the main focus of our paper, we do not provide a
lengthy discussion of this finding. Interested readers are encouraged to
contact the author for further discussion.
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Table 1: Spin outcomes and player bets
Frequency Percent Percent Outcome Frequency Percent
Outcome outcome outcome expected −expected bet bet
0/0 22 0.024 0.026 −0.002 354 0.016
0 25 0.028 0.026 0.001 442 0.020
1 23 0.025 0.026 −0.001 362 0.016
2 30 0.033 0.026 0.007 450 0.020
3 28 0.031 0.026 0.005 357 0.016
4 15 0.017 0.026 −0.010 375 0.017
5 28 0.031 0.026 0.005 636 0.028
6 20 0.022 0.026 −0.004 363 0.016
7 15 0.017 0.026 −0.010 682 0.030
8 26 0.029 0.026 0.002 633 0.028
9 23 0.025 0.026 −0.001 503 0.022
10 24 0.027 0.026 0.000 484 0.021
11 26 0.029 0.026 0.002 783 0.035
12 21 0.023 0.026 −0.003 360 0.016
13 21 0.023 0.026 −0.003 525 0.023
14 27 0.030 0.026 0.004 649 0.029
15 27 0.030 0.026 0.004 340 0.015
16 25 0.028 0.026 0.001 643 0.029
17 23 0.025 0.026 −0.001 1079 0.048
18 23 0.025 0.026 −0.001 518 0.023
19 30 0.033 0.026 0.007 595 0.026
20 24 0.027 0.026 0.000 983 0.044
21 26 0.029 0.026 0.002 447 0.020
22 32 0.035 0.026 0.009 576 0.026
23 24 0.027 0.026 0.000 746 0.033
24 18 0.020 0.026 −0.006 461 0.020
25 19 0.021 0.026 −0.005 521 0.023
26 15 0.017 0.026 −0.010 703 0.031
27 22 0.024 0.026 −0.002 490 0.022
28 25 0.028 0.026 0.001 827 0.037
29 23 0.025 0.026 −0.001 878 0.039
30 33 0.037 0.026 0.010 695 0.031
31 22 0.024 0.026 −0.002 664 0.029
32 29 0.032 0.026 0.006 925 0.041
33 17 0.019 0.026 −0.008 613 0.027
34 29 0.032 0.026 0.006 597 0.027
35 22 0.024 0.026 −0.002 627 0.028
36 22 0.024 0.026 −0.002 641 0.028
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Table 2: Hot outcome results by individual
112 possible 39 logistic models 112 possible 93 linear models
Coefficient logistic models w/o errors linear models w/o errors
Negative Significant (GF) 17 9 19 19
Negative Nonsignificant (GF) 39 11 36 29
Positive Nonsignificant (HO) 37 10 34 25
Positive Significant (HO) 19 9 23 20
Thus our final model is
Pit = α0 + α1Hit + α2Fit + α3Lit + ε
For each gambler we run two GLMs (one logistic and
one linear). Of the 139 gamblers in our sample, not all
had placed enough bets to allow us to estimate these mod-
els either with or without errors. Table 2 categorizes the
results of the coefficient on the hotness measure (α1) for
each individual using a variety of techniques and error
thresholds. Significant coefficients here represent esti-
mates that are significant at the 5% level using a two-
tailed test.
As Table 2 shows, we observe significant heterogene-
ity in the population. Approximately half of the players
in our data (depending which model the reader prefers)
can be categorized as gambler’s fallacy players; when a
number has previously appeared, the probability of their
betting on it decreases. The other half of the players in
our data can be categorized as hot outcome players; when
a number has previously appeared, the probability of their
betting on it increases.
One concern with this analysis, raised by an astute
referee, is that running so many regressions must result
in some false positives (or false negatives). To test for
whether simple chance is causing our results, we con-
ducted two further analyses. First, we looked at the un-
derlying p-values from the regressions in each column.
If these values had been generated randomly, we would
expect them to be uniformly distributed between 0 and
1. We compared the actual p-values to the uniform dis-
tribution using the Kolgoromov-Smirnov test. We con-
fidently reject the null hypothesis that the p-values were
generated by chance for each of the four columns in Ta-
ble 2 (p < .01 for all four comparisons). Within each
column, we run a similar test for the positive signifi-
cant/nonsignificant individuals, and the negative signif-
icant/nonsignificant individuals. Again, we confidently
reject the null hypothesis that the p-values were generated
by chance for each (p < .01 for all eight comparisons).
A more discrete analysis examines the existing cate-
gorizations. If the results were due to chance, we would
expect 5% of the observations to fall in the negative sig-
nificant category, 45% in the negative nonsignificant cate-
gory, 45% in the positive nonsignificant category and 5%
in the positive significant category. We compare the ac-
tual observations with this expected distribution using a
chi-squared test. We robustly reject the null that the p-
values were observed by chance (p < .0001 for all four
columns). A similar test on only the positive (negative)
observations yields similar results (p < .0001 for all eight
comparisons).
Results from this field study are consistent with pre-
vious lab studies demonstrating individual heterogeneity
in gambler’s fallacy/hot outcome beliefs. While some
gamblers cannot be classified reliably; those that can are
roughly equally split between betting in a fashion consis-
tent with the gambler’s fallacy and the hot outcome. In
the next subsection we continue our analysis of roulette
data by examining the hot hand and stock of luck biases.
3.3 Hot hand vs. stock of luck
There is an important conceptual difference between a be-
lief in hot outcomes (e.g., hot numbers) and the hot hand
(e.g., a hot person). Our second set of analyses investi-
gates whether individual’s behavior is consistent with hot
hand beliefs. To do this, we analyze whether gamblers bet
on more or fewer numbers in response to previous wins
and losses. Thus, if I’ve won in the past, I am hot and
more likely to be (more) in the future.
We first examine the average number of bets an indi-
vidual places after winning on the previous spin and after
losing on the previous spin. If the former is greater than
the latter, we say this person bets consistently with the
hot hand. If the reverse, we say this person bets consis-
tently with stock of luck. Of our 139 gamblers, 62 bet
consistently with the hot hand and 32 with the stock of
luck bias. Of the remaining 45 gamblers, 31 of them ei-
ther only won or only lost at the table in our sample while
14 played for only one spin of the wheel.
As a second, more formal analysis we run a general
linear model for each individual. The dependent variable
is the number of bets placed on spin t and the independent
variables include an indicator variable describing whether
the individual has won or lost on spin t-1. Table 3 reports
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the number of subjects whose parameter value falls into
each category. Ninety-six subjects could be categorized
in this way without errors.
As with the previous analysis of the gambler’s fallacy
versus the hot outcome, we find significant individual het-
erogeneity in the hot hand/stock of luck biases. Here,
more subjects act consistently with the hot hand bias
(which predicts a positive relationship between previous
wins and number of bets placed) than with the stock of
luck bias (which predicts a negative relationship). Simi-
lar reliability tests as those described above yield similar
results (p < .01 for the Kolgoromov-Smirnov tests and
p < .001 for the chi-squared tests).
Table 3: Hot hand results by individual
96 linear models
Coefficient without errors
Negative Significant (SL) 6
Negative Nonsignificant (SL) 37
Positive Nonsignificant (HH) 41
Positive Significant (HH) 12
3.4 Correlation of Biases
Our data allow us to independently characterize individ-
uals as gambler’s fallacy/hot outcome players and as hot
hand/stock of luck players. A further analysis examines
the distribution of players over those four types. Table 4
presents this distribution, categorizing players based on
the general linear models at the individual level reported
in Table 2 (the final column) and Table 3 including those
categorized as directional.13 We exclude 11 players who
are categorized on one dimension and not on another.
Table 4: Relationship between the biases
Hot outcome Gambler’s fallacy
Hot Hand 10 42
Stock-of-Luck 32 5
A chi-squared test strongly rejects the null hypothesis
of no relationship between the biases (p < .0001). In par-
ticular, there appears to be a correlation; players who act
13Other possible categorizations yield qualitatively identical results
(e.g., using those categorized both significantly and nonsignificantly re-
gardless of error, restricting attention to those categorized significantly,
either only without error or all and using the logistic models to catego-
rize the Gambler’s Fallacy/Hot Outcome subjects rather than the linear
models).
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Figure 3: Relationship between biases
consistently with the gambler’s fallacy (betting on num-
bers that haven’t appeared previously), are more likely to
act consistently with the hot hand (increasing the number
of bets they place after a win). Almost half the subjects
are in this first category, consistent with previous research
demonstrating both biases in the lab. In contrast, play-
ers who act consistently with the hot outcome (betting on
numbers that have appeared previously), are more likely
to act consistently with the stock-of-luck bias (decreasing
the number of bets they place after a win).
This relationship can be seen in Figure 3, below. Here
we graph, for each of the 89 individuals characterized in
Table 5, their regression parameters on the two biases.
What accounts for the pattern of individual beliefs
found in Figure 3? While further research will be neces-
sary to flesh out the variables underlying these patterns,
we propose locus of control as an organizing explanation
for this pattern. Originally developed by Rotter (1964),
Zimbardo (1985) defines locus of control as: “. . . a belief
about whether the outcomes of our actions are contingent
on what we do (internal locus of control) or on events out-
side our personal control (external control orientation)”
(p. 275).
Generally a person with an internal locus of control at-
tributes outcomes to personal decisions and efforts while
a person with an external locus of control attributes out-
comes to chance or other external factors. Applying this
concept to roulette, a person with an internal locus of con-
trol is likely to attribute previous wins to the decisions he
made and thus to connect such winning with gambling
skill. If a player has just won because of skill, then these
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skills should lead to more winning, which explains why
players with such beliefs increase their bets after winning,
exhibiting hot hand behavior. On the other hand, a per-
son with an external locus of control attributes winning to
simply luck. Thus a person with external locus of control
concludes that winning again after a previous win is less
likely and will decrease their bets after winning, exhibit-
ing stock of luck behavior.
Remember that while the hot hand/stock of luck de-
scribes beliefs of outcomes of the individual (like wins
and losses), the gambler’s fallacy/hot outcome describes
beliefs about outcomes of the random process (like heads
or tails). So how would the beliefs of a person with an in-
ternal or external locus of control differ regarding random
processes?
Consider first the person who has an external locus
of control and thus attributes outcomes to luck (stock of
luck). If one believes luck is in control of a random pro-
cess and three heads in a row have appeared, then one
should believe that luck will continue to control the out-
comes and that another head will appear. Put another
way, players who believe in luck are more likely to be-
lieve in streaks (hot outcomes) because luck produces
streaks. Thus the external locus of control causes both
stock of luck and hot outcome beliefs.
In contrast, a person with an internal locus of control
who believes that winning is a result of skill is likely to
reject the idea that the process producing the outcomes
is random since this would mitigate the skill involved.
A more plausible belief is that outcomes on the roulette
wheel are controlled by some process that can be learned
or discerned by the use of skill. When the internal per-
son wins, it is confirmation that she has ascertained the
pattern and this confidence leads her to bet more on the
next spin of the wheel (hot hand). The most plausible
cognitive explanation for her supposed pattern-detecting
skill is representativeness, which explains why she bets
consistently with the gambler’s fallacy. Thus the inter-
nal locus of control causes both hot hand and gambler’s
fallacy beliefs.
Unfortunately we could not collect locus of control or
other personality measures from our casino patrons, and
thus cannot test our speculation of the underlying causes
of the relationship between these two biases. Further lab
testing will be necessary to address this question, and to
compare this speculation with other candidate explana-
tions for our results.
4 Conclusions and discussion
This paper uses observational data to demonstrate the ex-
istence and impact of the hot hand and gambler’s fallacy
biases. We demonstrate the existence of significant bi-
ases even in this, sophisticated, population, providing an
important robustness check on previous laboratory data.
Like this previous research, we observe significant indi-
vidual heterogeneity in the population. Our participants
are split almost evenly between betting in a way consis-
tent with the gambler’s fallacy and consistent with the hot
outcome.
Importantly, however, our data allow us to investigate
the correlation of these biases at the individual level. We
find that gambler’s fallacy players are more likely to also
be hot hand gamblers. These relationships suggest there
may be an underlying construct determining biased be-
liefs that further research might illuminate. Candidates
for this construct have been suggested by us and others
(locus of control, representativeness, cognitive reflection
of Frederick [2005]), but further research in the lab will
be need to identify these potential mediators.
These results are consistent with those previously ob-
served in the lab (e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Chau &
Phillips, 1995). That these observations are robust in the
field with real money on the line and real participants
is reassuring. However, the limitations inherent in field
data admit of alternative interpretations of our results.
For example, the hot outcome effect may be explained
by an availability bias; individuals are more likely to bet
on numbers that have recently won not because they be-
lieve these numbers more likely to win again but instead
because they’re easily called to mind. The hot hand ef-
fect may be explained by an income or house money ef-
fect; individuals bet on more numbers after they have won
not because they believe that they (personally) are more
likely to win again but because they’re richer, or are play-
ing with the house’s money. While these alternative ex-
planations can explain some results, they don’t provide
satisfactory explanations for the heterogeneity of the data
at the individual level, nor for the correlation between the
biases observed within the individual.
These limitations suggest further research combining
empirical and questionnaire data in a way that we were
prevented from accomplishing here. For example, a
think-aloud protocol might provide evidence in favor or
against these alternative explanations. Gathering psycho-
logical measures like locus of control as well as demo-
graphic information might help us to predict what type of
biased beliefs an individual is likely to have. Finally, our
data infers beliefs from observed actions; eliciting beliefs
directly via a questionnaire, then observing actions would
provide a useful check on our results. These combina-
tions of field and lab data are attractive, but will require
extreme cooperation from a casino, which is not currently
available.
Other future projects might involve data from other
non-autocorrelated casino games (e.g., craps, slot ma-
chines) both to replicate our current findings and to search
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for differences between the games. Finally, there are a
number of other questions one might explore using the
existing data including conformity (the correlation of bet-
ting across players as in Blank, 1968), the status quo bias
(probability of leaving winning bets as they lie), the psy-
chology of near misses (when an individual’s bet almost
wins), and when players leave the game (breaking even,
busting out). While these data are not as targeted as that
from the lab, we see empirical data as an opportunity to
provide a robustness-check on (and external validity for)
experimentally-observed biases.
Almost every decision we make involves uncertainty
in some way, both over individual events and over se-
quences of events. Previous research has demonstrated
a number of biases in how individuals perceive and re-
act to this uncertainty, but the demonstrations have been
primarily in the lab, using undergraduate student partic-
ipants. This paper uses data from individuals gambling
with their own money in a casino to test for the presence
of these biases in a naturally-occurring environment. The
behavior we observe is indeed consistent with previously-
observed biases, providing an important robustness check
on the previous research. We observe significant individ-
ual heterogeneity among the population in their direction
and strength of each bias.
In addition, our data allows us to identify these biases
separately within each individual, and to examine the cor-
relation between them. We find a significant and positive
correlation between individuals who act in accordance
with gambler’s fallacy beliefs and with hot hand beliefs,
suggesting a unifying cause for the two illusions. Fur-
ther research will be needed to identify this cause, and to
help us predict an individual’s biases and their resulting
actions.
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